Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Graco Fishing and Rental Tools v. Ironwood
Exploration, Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
F. Alen Fletcher; Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher; Attorneys for Appellants.
Harry H. Souvall; Robert M. McRae; McRae & Deland; Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Graco Fishing and Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., No. 870170.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1654

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GRACO FISHING AND RENTAL
TOOLS, INC. and I. G.
SPECIALTY MACHINE SHOP,
Plaintiffs,
Respondents and
Cross-Appellants,
vs.
IRONWOOD EXPLORATION, INC.,
R. D. POINDEXTER, HORIZON
OIL & GAS COMPANY, WILLIAM
H. WALTON and ARDEN A.
ANDERSON,

No. 870170
Priority Schedule No. 14b

Defendants,
Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Seventh Judicial District
Court for Duchesne County
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge

F. Alan Fletcher, No. 1088
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8446
Attorneys for Appellants
Harry H. Souvall, No. 5919
Robert M. McRae, No. 2217
McRAE & DELAND
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-1666
Attorneys for Respondents

FILED
SEP 2 S1937
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GRACO FISHING AND RENTAL
TOOLS, INC. and I. G.
SPECIALTY MACHINE SHOP,
Plaintiffs,
Respondents and
Cross-Appellants,
vs.
IRONWOOD EXPLORATION, INC.,
R. D. POINDEXTER, HORIZON
OIL & GAS COMPANY, WILLIAM
H. WALTON and ARDEN A.
ANDERSON,

No. 870170
Priority Schedule No. 14b

Defendants,
Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,

APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Seventh Judicial District
Court for Duchesne County
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge

F. Alan Fletcher, No. 1088
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8446
Attorneys for Appellants
Harry H. Souvall, No. 5919
Robert M. McRae, No. 2217
McRAE & DELAND
209 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-1666
Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT

3

I.

GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE
SERVICES IT PROVIDED
1.
2.
3.
4.

II.

III.
IV.

Rental Charges
Equipment Sales
Transportation Charges
Repair Charges

3
4
7
9
11

GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON ISSUES ON
WHICH IT DID NOT PREVAIL

11

UTAH'S CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE
DOES NOT APPLY TO EQUIPMENT RENTALS

14

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
GRACO ITS RECOVERY ON THE THEORY
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT

17

CONCLUSION

19

ADDENDUM

Attachment No.

Section 38-10-102, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended in 1987)

1

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended prior to 1985)

2

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended in 1985)

3

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Christensen v. Industrial Commission,
642 P.2d 755 (Utah, 1982)

9, 10

Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc.
v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah, 1977)

18

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah, 1978)

12

Stanton Transportation Company vs. Davis,
341 P.2d 207, 9 Utah 2d 184 (1959)
Utah Farm Production Credit Association
v. Cox, 627 P. 2d 62 (Utah, 1981)

8, 9, 10
. .13

Statutes:
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended, 1981)

5, 6, 7, 11

Section 38-10-101, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended 1987)

7, 10

Section 38-10-102, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended 1987)

7, 10

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended 1977)

16

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended 1985)

17

ii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
On this

appeal, Defendant/Appellant

Ironwood

Exploration,

Inc. ("Ironwood" herein) has raised the following issues:
Do the mechanics1

1.

lien statutes

(§ 38-1-1, et seq.,

Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) entitle Graco to recover
from the lessee of an oil well location charges incurred incident
to rental of equipment, sale of equipment not consumed on the
project, transportation charges, or charges for repair of rented
equipment?
2.

The court below improperly held that they do.
Do the attorney's

fees provisions of the mechanics1

lien statutes (§ 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended))
entitle Graco to an award of all attorney's fees incurred where
it prevailed on only a portion of its claims and/or the fees were
incurred in prosecution of matters other than lien foreclosure?
Again, the court below improperly held that they do.
On
Rental

cross-appeal,

Plaintiff/Respondent

Graco

Tools, Inc. ("Graco" herein) has raised

Fishing and
the following

additional issues:
3.
Annotated,

Does the contractors' bond statute, § 14-2-1, Utah Code
apply to rental services performed on an oil well?

The court below properly held that it does not.
4.

Is Graco entitled to recover from Ironwood on a theory

of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit when it had an express
1

contract with a third party to provide the rental equipment?

The

court below correctly held that it is not.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Graco is not entitled to a mechanics1 lien on Ironwood's oil
well because the statute, as it existed at the time Graco rented
its

equipment

to

Ironwood's

drilling

contractor,

contemplate such a lien for unpaid rentals.

did

not

Graco similarly is

not entitled to a lien for equipment sold because that equipment
did not become a part of the premises, nor was it consumed in the
Also, Graco T s claim of lien for

process of developing the well.
transportation

charges made

in connection

with the

equipment

rentals and for expenses incurred to repair the rental equipment
must fail because such charges are beyond the contemplation of
the mechanics1 lien laws.
The lower court erred in awarding attorney

fees to Graco

because it did not carry its burden of proving the fees claimed
were incurred
lien

in the successful

claims, and

not

prosecution of its mechanics1

in the unsuccessful

prosecution

subcontractors' bond and unjust enrichment or implied
claims.

of

its

contract

Graco is only entitled to an award of attorney fees on

those claims on which it prevailed.

2

On cross-appeal, Graco asserts that the lower court erred in
refusing to award it judgment on its contractors' bond claim.
The court ruled correctly, however, because at the time Graco
entered into its rental contract, the statute did not contemplate
that such a bond would be required for equipment rentals.
Finally, Graco also contends on its cross-appeal
should

have

recovered

contract claims.

on

its

unjust

enrichment

or

that it
implied

However, it had an express contract with a

third party and a cause of action for implied contract will never
lie where there is an express contract.

ARGUMENT
I.

GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A LIEN
FOR THE SERVICES IT PROVIDED

At the outset of its argument, Graco recites several general
tenets of statutory construction, i.e., that statutes should be
given a plain reading, ambiguities should be resolved to give
primary effect to the intent of the Legislature, and the statute
should be read as a whole and in light of the general purpose it
was intended to serve and should be applied to accomplish that
purpose.
particular

Brief

of

quarrel

Respondents,
with

those

pp. 5-6.
basic

Ironwood

rules

because

has

no

their

application to the mechanics' lien statute in question compels a
finding that the statute does not apply to the services Graco

3

rendered.

We

again

consider

each

category

of

service

independently:
1.

Rental

Appellants'

Charges.

Brief,

it

is

As

discussed

at

length

Ironwood's position that the

in

its

rental

charges asserted by Graco are not lienable items and, therefore,
will not support the lower court's judgment herein.
Brief, pp. 6-9.

Appellants'

The basis of that contention is that the 1981

Utah Legislature amended the mechanics' lien statute to include a
lien for rentals, but only to the extent the rental was made in
conjunction with the construction or improvement of a building;
the amendment did not apply to rentals in connection with the
development of oil and gas wc^lls.
Ironwood

quoted

the

To demonstrate

statute, utilizing

bracketed

that fact,
numbers

identify its four separate and distinct provisions:
[1] Contractors, subcontractors and all
persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in
the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement
to any premises in any manner; [2] all
persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the prospecting, development,
preservation or working of any mining claim,
mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit;
[3] and licensed architects and engineers and
artisans who have furnished designs, plats,
p l a n s , m a p s , specifications, drawings,
estimates
of
cost,
surveys
or
superintendence, or who have rendered other
like professional service, or bestowed labor,
[4] shall have a lien upon the property upon
or concerning which they have rendered

to

service, performed labor or furnished or
rented materials or equipment for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed or
materials or equipment furnished or rented by
each respectively, . . . .
Appellants' Brief, p. 7; Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated (as
amended, 1981) (brackets and emphasis supplied).

It is clear

that only the provisions following bracketed numbers 1 and 4 were
amended.
Graco, on the other hand, asserts that the statute, so far
as it applies to rentals in connection with development of oil
wells, should be read as an independent section as follows:
All persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the prospecting, development,
preservation or working of any . . . oil and
gas well . . . shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or
furnished or rendered materials, or equipment
for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed or materials or equipment furnished
or rented by each respectfully . . . .
Brief of Respondents, p. 7.

That suggestion, however, does not

stand up to the very tenets of statutory construction posed by
Graco.

If Graco's suggestion were similarly applied to the first

portion of the statute, it would read as follows:
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in
the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement
to any premises in any manner . . . shall
have a lien upon the property upon or
5

concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented
materials or equipment for the value of the
service rendered, labor performed or
materials or equipment furnished or rented by
each respectively . ~. ~. 71

(Emphasis added.)

It will be observed that in rewriting the

first portion of the statute in the manner suggested by Graco for
the second, a duplication of the equipment rental provisions
becomes apparent.

Thus, in order to accept Graco's proposition,

it must be concluded that the Legislature deemed it important to
insert the words "or renting" and "or equipment" in the third
line of the first portion of the statute, whereas it did not deem
it necessary to do so at the similar location in the second
portion of the statute.

We prcssume that the Legislature intended

the words "or renting" and "or equipment" to mean something in
the first portion and the conspicuous absence thereof in the
second portion suggests the Legislature

intended

something

entirely different with respect to the second portion, i.e., that
the cost of equipment rental is not a lienable item with respect
to the development of oil and gas wells.
This conclusion is well supported by a subsequent amendment
of the mechanics' lien statutes.

In 1987, the Utah Legislature

again amended Section 38-1-3 to delete all of the second portion
1

The third portion of the statute, pertaining to licensed
architects, engineers, etc. could be similarly rewritten.
6

thereof as set forth between [2] and [3] in our example, i.e., to
remove all reference to mining claims, oil or gas wells, etc.
amended,

Section

38-1-3

now

contains

only

the

first

As

portion

(following [1]) and the third and fourth portions (following [3]
and [4] ).
The Legislature then completely rewrote the lien provisions
as they
Sections
amended

relate

to oil, gas and mining

38-10-101, et: seq.,
1987);

provisions

Addendum

formerly

Utah

No. 1.

found

in a new Chapter 10.

Code Annotated

The mining

in Section 38-1-3,

(1953, as

and oil
as

and gas

substantially

modified and expanded, are now found in Section 38-10-102.
detailed

reading

of

that

amended

statute

discloses

A

that

references to equipment rentals as being lienable items are again
conspicuously

absent.

The Legislature obviously gave a great

deal of thought to the substantial 1987 amendments and it must be
concluded that it did not intend that equipment rentals would
support a lien, which is the same intent the Legislature had when
it amended the statute in 1981 and refused to provide that rental
of equipment would support a lien in connection with oil well
development.
2.

Equipment

Sales.

In its opening Appellants' Brief,

Ironwood contended that the $5,919.14 charged
drill

pipe

and

gaskets

will

not
7

support

for the sale of

the

alleged

lien.

Appellants1 Brief, pp. 9-10.
suggestion

In response, Graco argues that the

that the drill pipe

and gaskets were removed

upon

completion of the project and, therefore, are not part of the
improvements,

is

unsupported

Respondents, p. 8.

in

the

record.

Brief

of

Conversely, the record also does not show

that the pipe and gaskets were in fact "consumed" or became a
part

of the well

in the drilling process

as required

Stanton court so as to support the imposition of a lien.

by the
Stanton

Transportation Company v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 211, 9 Utah 2d 184
(1959).
Graco

Graco has lost track of who has the burden of proof.

has

asserted

support a lien.
point.

][d.

that

the

equipment

it has

furnished

will

Therefore, it has the burden of proof on that

There being no evidence that the drill pipe and

gaskets were consumed in the drilling process, ass Graco points
out, it has failed to carry its burden.
Graco
"equipment

also

asserts

that

the

drill

pipe

and

gaskets

are

furnished" under a rental agreement and, therefore,

are covered by the amended mechanics1
Respondents, pp. 8-9.

lien statute.

Brief of

That is the same argument it makes with

respect to rental equipment and Ironwood's response thereto will
not

be repeated

here.

The court

is referred

charges" portion of this Brief, supra, pp. 4-7.

8

to the

"rental

3,

Transportation Charges.

Ironwood contends that charges

for the transportation of rental equipment also do not support a
lien, both because they are not specifically provided for in the
mechanics' lien statute and because the Stanton court expressly
disallowed liens for transportation charges.
pp. 10-11.

Graco disagrees on both counts.

Appellants' Brief,
Brief of Respondents,

pp. 9-10.
The argument with respect to the applicability of the lien
statute to rental contracts has been previously made and will not
be restated here.
are

covered,

As to its argument that transportation charges

Graco

misapprehends

the

effect

amendments to the mechanics' lien statute.
of

statutory

Legislature

of

A fundamental tenet

construction which Graco overlooks
will

be

presumed

to

have

post-Stanton

adopted

is that
the

the

judicial

interpretation of statutes if it subsequently amends the statute
without

change

to the judicially

principle was specifically

interpreted

language.

The

stated in Christensen v. Industrial

Commission, 642 P. 2d 755, 766 (Utah, 1982), which was cited by
Graco:

A w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d canon of s t a t u t o r y
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t where a
l e g i s l a t u r e amends a portion of a s t a t u t e but
leaves other portions unamended, or r e - e n a c t s
them w i t h o u t change, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s
presumed to have been s a t i s f i e d with p r i o r
j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e unchanged
p o r t i o n s of the s t a t u t e and to have adopted
them as c o n s i s t e n t with i t s own i n t e n t .
9

Id., 756 (citations omitted).

Thus, looking at Stanton, we find
!l

this Court specifically holding:

[T]hat the item . . . for the

transportation of plaintiffs' drilling rig does not come within
the intent and purpose of the statute and was not a valid lien
against the defendant's property."

341 P.2d 211.

Since this Court made that interpretation of the statute in
1959, it has been amended not once, but twice.
previously
relating

discussed,

to

the

construction

of

transportation

it was

rental

of

buildings
charges

as

amended

equipment
but

no

to

add

the

in connection

change

lienable

In 1981, as

was

items.

made

provisions
with
to

the

allow

Therefore,

the

Legislature is presumed under the rule enunciated in Christensen,
supra, to have accepted this Court's exclusion thereof as being
consistent with the legislative

intent.

Thereafter, the

1987

Legislature again amended the statute to delete references to oil
and gas wells and mining from the original statute and enact a
new statute covering those items as Section 38-10-101, et seq.
This time, however, the Legislature specifically provided that
the lien for oil and gas development work "shall be for the value
of the work performed or materials or equipment furnished for:
. . . (e) transportation
work

performed

or

and related mileage

materials

or

equipment

Section 38-10-102(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated
10

charges, for any

furnished . . . •"
(1953, as amended

1987);

Addendum

No.

1.

Thus,

in

1987

the

Legislature

acknowledged that there was no lien for transportation charges
under

former

Section

38-1-3

and

it

then

provided

transportation charges in its 1987 amendment.

for

such

However, the 1987

statute is not applicable here since the work done by Graco was
performed

in 1983 and 1984, prior to the 1987 amendment and,

therefore, the statute as it previously existed must be applied.
4.
charged

Repair Charges.
for repair

Graco contends that the $1,096.00 it

and inspection of its rental

equipment

is

likewise covered by the mechanics' lien statute for the reasons
previously

discussed.

respectfully
Appellants'

disagrees
Brief

(supra, pp. 4-7).

Brief of Respondents, p. 10.
for the reasons stated

(p. 11) and

in

its prior

Ironwood

in its opening
argument

Ironwood will not restate those

herein

arguments

here, other than to reiterate that since the statute does not
apply to the rental of equipment used in developing oil wells,
the repair and inspection of that equipment likewise cannot be
covered.

II.

GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES ON ISSUES ON WHICH IT DID NOT PREVAIL

Ironwood

contended

in its opening Appellants' Brief

that

Graco is not entitled to the $3,798.75 attorney fee awarded by
the District Court because it failed to distinguish in its proof
11

of

fees

as

to

those

which

were

prosecution of its mechanics1

incurred

in the

successful

lien claim and those which were

incurred in the unsuccessful prosecution of its contractors1 bond
and unjust enrichment or implied contract claims.
Brief, pp. 11-15.

Appellants1

Graco disputes that contention, attempts to

distinguish the cases supporting Ironwood's position, and asserts
without citation of any authority whatsoever that the prevailing
party

under

the

lien

statute

should

be

awarded

all

of

its

reasonable attorney's fees regardless of other theories it may
have pled.

Respondents' Brief, p. 13.

Graco attempts to distinguish the cases cited by Ironwood in
its opening Appellants' Brief on the ground that they involved
situations
incurred

in which

in the

a portion

successful

of

the

prosecution

attorney's

fees

of

for which

a claim

were

attorney's fees were allowable and the balance of the fees were
incurred in the defense of counterclaims for which attorney fees
would

not be

allowed.

Although that observation

is correct,

Graco misses the message that this Court conveyed

in deciding

those cases.

In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah, 1978), the

Court said:

"[L]iability for payment of attorney's fees extends

only

to

the

contract."

amount

necessary

!Id., p. 604.

for

the

enforcement

of

the

In the context of the instant action,

that rule requires that the award of attorney's fees be limited
12

to the amount necessary for the enforcement of the lien.

The

rule does not allow the award of attorney's fees under the lien
statute

for

enrichment

prosecution

and

of

other

contractors' bond

theories,

claims.

And

i.e.,

unjust

in Utah

Farm

Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah, 1981),
it was

said:

"A party

is . . . entitled only to those

fees

resulting from its principle cause of action for which there is a
contractual

(or

statutory) obligation

for

attorney's

fees."

Here, the only statutory obligation is with respect to the lien
statute and there is no contractual obligation

for

attorney's

fees in Graco's other theories of recovery.
Graco asserts that it is entitled to an award of all of its
attorney's fees under the mechanics' lien statute, even though
some of those fees were incurred in the unsuccessful prosecution
of

its

contractors'

bond

claims

(for

which

fees

would

be

awardable to Graco only if it prevailed) and for the unsuccessful
prosecution of its unjust enrichment or implied contract claims
(for which
success).

no

fees would

be

awardable

regardless of

Graco's

If this approach were adopted, it would be tantamount

to saying that an attorney's fee provision from one statute or
contract can be applied

in awarding

fees under another.

For

instance, if Graco had prevailed on its unjust enrichment claim
but

lost on its mechanics' lien claim, could the Court
13

award

attorney's fees to Graco under the attorney fee provisions of the
mechanics' lien statute simply because it alleged a mechanics'
lien claim?

No.

Clearly, Graco would not be entitled to its

fees if it did not prevail under the mechanics' lien statute.
That being the case, why then should it recover fees for the
prosecution of similarly unrelated claims on which it did not
prevail

and for which it would not be entitled

to

attorney's

fees?
Graco suggests that the requirement that counsel segregate
the fees as to the various theories being prosecuted would be
unworkable.
track

of

This Court has already

the

time

expended

required

in prosecution of

counsel

a complaint

opposed to time expended in defense of a counterclaim.
workable.

It would

different theories.

work

just

as well

to keep

in keeping

as

That is
track

of

In filing an attorney fee claim, counsel

need only to sit down and in good faith ask himself or herself
whether the work done during any particular time segment related
in any way to work for which attorney's fees are awardable.

If

so, the fees would be claimed; if not, they would not.

III.

UTAH'S CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE DOES
NOT APPLY TO EQUIPMENT RENTALS

By way of cross-appeal, Graco contends that the
Court erred in denying its contractors' bond claims.
14

District

In support

of its contention, Graco simply asserts that this Court should
rewrite

the contractors1

bond

statute to add a provision

requiring such a bond if the contract includes rental expenses
for equipment.

We agree that the Court has on occasion referred

to the mechanics' lien statute to construe the contractors1 bond
statute as asserted by Graco.

Respondents' Brief, p. 15.

The

Court is limited in such referral, however, to its effort to
determine the legislative intent -- it cannot write into the
contractors' bond statute something that the Legislature has
omitted, i.e., rental provisions.
The contractors' bond statute reads in pertinent part as
follows:2
The owner of any interest in land entering
into a contract . . . for the construction,
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any
building, structure or improvement upon land
shall . . . obtain from the contractor a bond
in a sum equal to the contract price . . .
conditioned for the faithful performance of
the contract and prompt payment for material
furnished and labor performed under the
contract. . . . [A]ny person who has
furnished materials or performed labor for or
upon any such building, structure or
improvement, payment for which has not been
made, shall have a direct right of action
against the sureties upon such bond for the
2

At pages 13 and 14 of its Brief of Respondents, Graco has
quoted the contractors' bond statute in full.
However, the
quotation is of the statute as it was amended in 1985, not as it
existed in December, 1983 and January, 1984, the pertinent period
for our purposes. As will be seen, this is a very important oversight.
15

reasonable value of the materials furnished
or labor performed . . . .
Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
Addendum No. 2.

(1953, as amended 1977);

This statute differs in at least two material

respects from the mechanics' lien statute as it existed at the
time Graco performed its rental contract.

First, this statute

had not been amended to include the rental of equipment as
occurred with the mechanics1 lien statute of 1981.

Second, there

was no reference whatsoever to the development of oil wells as is
provided in the mechanics' lien statute.
mechanics1

Thus, referral to the

lien statute as an aid to interpretation of the

contractors' bond statute is of no avail.

Because there is no

mention of either the fact that the bond statute is intended to
apply to rentals or to oil and gas development, we must conclude
that it does not so apply.
That conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent act of the
Legislature in 1985.

As indicated previously in footnote 2, the

Legislature amended the statute in 1985 in several particulars,
including the addition of the words "equipment and materials
rented" near the end of the current first sentence, the words "or
rented any equipment or" near the first portion of what is now
the third sentence, and the words "for the reasonable value of
the rented materials or equipment furnished" near the end of what
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is now the third sentence3 .

See § 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated

(as amended, 1985); Addendum No- 3.

The Legislature has thus

demonstrated that in its collective judgment the statute (as it
provided at the time Graco rented the equipment to Lantz) did not
contemplate that rentals would require a bond.

Since it did not

so provide, the District Court properly dismissed Graco T s claim
for judgment thereon.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED GRACO ITS
RECOVERY ON THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Also in its cross-appeal, Graco has asserted that Ironwood
has been unjustly

enriched

in the

amount

of

$10,035.00, the

amount it did not pay its general contractor, Lantz Drilling &
Exploration Company, Inc., under the contract between them; to
remedy that alleged inequity, Graco asks this Court to imply a
contract
pp. 16-17.

between

Graco

and

Ironwood. 4

Respondents 1

Brief,

Graco f s unjust enrichment theory is, however, barred

3

The statute was further amended in 1987 but, since the
pertinent period for purposes of this action is December, 1983
and January, 1984, that amendment is of no import.
4

Graco argues that Ironwood must pay someone the amount that
it did not pay Lantz. However, should this Court disagree with
Ironwood*s contentions on this appeal (i.e., that judgment was
improperly entered against it on the mechanics' lien claims),
then Ironwood will have paid, or be liable for payment of, more
than the amount it retained from its contract with Lantz and,
therefore, it could not be unjustly enriched in that amount.
17

as a matter of law and, therefore, the District Court's denial
thereof must be sustained.
In Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564
P. 2d 773 (Utah, 1977), the defendant Adams was the owner of a
building which he leased to Great Outdoors Inc. which, in turn,
contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase of materials used
in modifying the building.

When Great Outdoors Inc. did not pay

for the goods, the plaintiff filed suit against Adams, alleging
an implied contract between it and Adams on the claim that he had
been unjustly enriched.

This Court refused to allow the unjust

enrichment claim for a number of reasons, one of which was that
there can be no implied agreement where there exists an express
agreement:
It is also noted that there was an express
contract between plaintiff and the lessee for
the furnishing of materials, and when an
express agreement exists one may not be
implied.
Id., 564 P.2d 774 (citations omitted).
here.

The same situation exists

Graco had an express contract with Lantz Drilling &

Exploration Company, Inc. for the rental of the equipment for
which Graco now seeks judgment from Ironwood.
of the Record on Appeal, Par. 3.

Agreed Statement

The existence of that express

rental subcontract bars Gracofs unjust enrichment claim against
Ironwood as a matter of law.
18

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Point I above, this Court
should reverse the lower court and enter judgment in favor of
Ironwood

and against Graco, no cause of action, on Graco's

mechanics' lien claims.

The lower court's award of attorney fees

to Graco should also be reversed in view of Graco's failure to
establish that the fees it claims were incurred in prosecution of
claims on which it prevailed.
With respect to Graco's cross-appeal, the lower court's
denial of recovery on both Graco's contractors' bond claim and
its unjust enrichment claim should be affirmed.
DATED this

<^^>

day of September, 1987.

PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
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the

foregoing

ADDENDUM
ATTACHMENT
NO:

ITEM:
Section 38-10-102, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended in 1987)

1

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended prior to 1985)

2

Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated
(as amended in 1985)

3
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ADDENDUM "1

38-10-102. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached
— Qualifying work, materials, equipment, and
costs — Liability of nonoperating owners.
(1) Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing work upon, or
furnishing materials or equipment for any production unit, under contract
with the owner, or the owner's agent or contractor shall have a lien upon the
interest of the owner in:
(a) the production unit and access rights appurtenant thereto;
(b) pipelines, including rights of way, buildings, wells, oil tanks, and
appurtenances located on the land or leasehold within the production
unit; and
(c) the ore, minerals, oil, gas, or associated substances in the ground, or
while the same remain in storage on the production unit, which are attributable to the interest subject to the lien as the interest existed on the
date work was first performed or materials or equipment were first furnished.
(2) The lien upon the interest of the owner in property described in Subsections (l)(a) through (c) shall be for the value of the work performed or materials or equipment furnished for:
(a) open pit work, field processing, construction, alteration, digging,
drilling, driving, boring, operating, perforating, fracturing, testing, logging, acidizing, cementing, completion, repair, maintenance, prospecting,
sampling, exploration, development, preservation, performing geophysical, geochemical, location, or assessment work, or related activities;
(b) work performed or materials or equipment furnished in accordance
with a pooling order, or pursuant to an operating agreement, or other
agreement governing joint mining, or oil, and gas operations;
(c) title services, designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys, permitting, or regulatory compliance;
(d) foreclosure costs including publication, costs of sale, sheriffs fees,
attorney's fees, and other costs of collection; and
(e) transportation and related mileage charges, for any work performed
or materials or equipment furnished pursuant to Subsections (2)(a)
through (d).
(3) For purposes of this section, the operator under a joint operating agreement, unit operating agreement, or other agreement granting one owner control of operations on the production unit shall not be considered to be the
agent or contractor of the nonconsenting, nonoperating owners. The operator
shall, however, have the lien granted under Subsection (1) upon the interest of
all nonoperating owners for work performed, or materials or equipment furnished by the operator; and the nonoperating owners shall have the lien
granted under Subsection (1) upon the interest of the operator for work performed, or materials or equipment furnished by third persons to the extent the
nonoperating owners have paid or advanced funds to the operator for such
work, materials, or equipment.
History: C. 1953, 38-10-102, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 170, S 6.

ADDENDUM "2

14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.—The owner of any
interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced,
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance
of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to
all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building,
structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall
have a direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon; which right of
action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or
default in the performance, of the work provided for in the contract.
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
History: L. 1015, ch. 01, §§1-3; C. L.
1917, §§3759-3761; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-1.

NOTE: A printed version of the statute as arrended in 1977
is not available. The language in 1977 (and until
1985) was identical to the above except that the
triggering contract amount was changed from $500
to $2,000 in 1977.

ADDENDUM "3

14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished,
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request.
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1 to 3; C.L.
1917, §§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1.

